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By. Dr. Richard L. Benkin
The latest issue of India-based Foreign Policy Research Centre (FPRC) has been published: “India’s ‘Juggling’ Relationship with Major Power. The issue contains online interviews with questions about India and its relationship with major powers. FPRC is an excellent institution, founded by Prof. Mahendra Gaur, and is opening a school focused on India and foreign affairs. I'm proud to be part of it. My answer focuses on India’s increasing geopolitical importance, how India’s actions reflect that. addresses how India's neighborhood relations must be seen now within the context of India's rise as a global superpower; and that as an American, I'm familiar with how a superpower is understood by other nations (sometimes for the better, sometimes for the worse). My section of the FPRC journal is on pages 28-33.
Dr. Richard L. Benkin, Independent Human Rights Activist, Advisor Foreign Policy School(BHARAT) https://fpsbharat.com/
1. How do you look at India's "Juggling" relationship with Major Powers?
Reflecting India’s increased geopolitical prominence and power, its global relationships and actions are determined—and must be determined—by realpolitik. This takes a cold calculation of Indian interests, the risk/reward ratio, and what is in the best interests of India. As I have said numerous times within the pages of these journals, ultimately, today’s geopolitics are defined by the global struggle between democracy (led by the United States and India) and authoritarianism (led by China and Russia). India’s position is as tricky as any; and India’s tepid response to Bangladesh’s recent anti-Hindu atrocities is a good example of that. (Ironically, the global anti-Modi, anti-BJP detractors have been claiming since 2013, that this is a “radical Hindu nationalist government” whose first concern is to favor Hindus and marginalize everyone else. And of course, neither they nor their associates in the media have ever mention this dagger in the heart of their claim.) Complicating things even more, India has a very long and strong relationship with major authoritarian countries, Russia and Iran. And its relationship with China, the leader of that bloc, while one of competition and conflicting interests, is to say the least, complicated.
Now, the good thing about all this is that everyone knows who has relations with whom. Hence, the Iranian axis unleashed terror on October 7, 2023, as Saudi Arabia and other Arab nations drew close to formalizing their relations with Israel and joining the democratic bloc, with additional US ties as part of the bundle. That would have checkmated Iranian goals for authoritarian hegemony in the region and control of critical trade routes and assets. Moreover, we should consider the real possibility that those “juggled” powers don’t mind things unfolding this way. Regardless of the friendly meetings Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has had with Russian President Vladimir Putin, US leaders feel pretty secure that India’s relationship with Russia is nowhere near the level of their “historic friendship.” Even after the Cold War ended, you still found large numbers of Russian advisors and trainers in India, and Russia remained India’s biggest arms supplier until recently. In fact, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, noted that 2019-2023 was the first five year period since 1960-1964 that Russia did not account for a majority of India’s arms imports. Thus, it is no surprise that US officials periodically express consternation with India’s ongoing purchases of Russian energy and raise it at high level. But they have taken no action to stop it or even threatened it.
There is another critical factor to bear in mind. India and the United States (US/USA) are democracies that witness regularly scheduled elections. These elections often bring changes in government from one party’s dominance to another. The United States, for instance, tends to have a more robust foreign policy under Republican regimes that often push their nation’s advantages in global negotiations and conflict. Democrats, on the other hand, tend to opt first for building consensus, diplomacy, and accommodation, even if it means playing down US advantages. Similarly, India’s global profile and critical geopolitical dominance has come into its own, only since the advent of a Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government; whereas the previous Congress Party-dominated government was far less assertive in its international relations. But in neither case does that change of the party in power mean discarding previous geopolitical goals. It can mean different priorities, or changes in how they want to go about achieving their goals. The most successful countries are those that can in fact “juggle” their relations successfully, keeping adversaries at bay or at least guessing at what their next move will be.
India should, must, and is determining its geopolitical actions based on what is best for India. That, in fact, is the critical difference between Indian policy today and that of previous Indian regimes. As a friend and admirer of India who has been coming there for many years, putting Indian interests first, and not dwelling on how others want India to act, is the key to understanding why India is today recognized by most in the world as a global superpower with a trajectory that is only pointing up as we move through this century.
2. It's "A Tightrope Walk" so far as India's strategic ties with Russia are concerned. Do you agree?
Sort of, and only for the moment. Russia still has pretensions of being a great power. Putin and others in the Kremlin seek to recreate a new Soviet Union under Russian hegemony. (Putin has called the fall of the USSR the greatest disaster of the twentieth century—a century filled with great disasters.) But Russia’s failure in Ukraine, the economic and military dominance of Poland, and those former Soviet Republics and buffer states joining or moving closer to NATO make that highly unlikely. Russia is at best a declining power. Moreover, Russia faces extremely challenging demographics, as discussed in some detail in my entry in FPRC’s March 2024 edition. Its 1.5377 total fertility rate is well below the 2.1 rate needed just to maintain its population, which peaked over 30 years ago. It has been declining ever since. Russia began this century as the seventh most populous country in the world and will end it at Number 20, according to the most optimistic projections. The more pessimistic ones have Russia losing half its population by 2100. To show how serious the problem is, Russian media is where we see frightening headlines about those most pessimistic projections, not from Russia’s detractors. Russian planners have been sounding the alarm for years, but no one seems to be listening.
This is important because without its large population, Russia cannot sustain its economy. The Russian military, moreover, always has been characterized by its ability to send wave after wave of soldiers and to sustain unheard of casualties in order to outlast its opponents—something it seems to be trying with Ukraine but instead is making those pessimistic population figures ever more likely. And as both China and Russia lose population and witness economic and military collapse, both also will realize that they cannot go after either the US or India with any hope of success. In fact, more and more military experts see China turning its sights to Russia’s mineral rich east with a realistic expectation that Russia will not be able to defend it. (There also is a Siberian separatist movement that no doubt will give China an expectation of success. Eventually, it will be Russia that has to make the accommodations, not India. But even now, I’m not sure that India is really walking a tightrope with Russia. Indian leaders know what Russia can and cannot offer, and what they must continue to seize upon while continuing to develop. They also know that their interests lay with other democracies and the sort of opportunities that unleash and reward the talents of its giant population at home and in the diaspora. India’s relations with Russia play an important part in letting the US and others know that India is important enough and self-aware enough to make decisions based on its best interests; and the rest the world will have to work around them.
3. US ambassador to India Eric Garcetti, recently said that both India and the US shouldn’t
take their relationship for granted because “while it is wide and it is deeper than it’s ever been,
it is not yet deep enough”. Should the extreme fragility of the US-India partnership worry
India?
I agree entirely with Ambassador Garcetti that we want to see an even deeper relationship between the two countries, however, I do not think India should be worried. Even America’s strongest bi-lateral relationships experience periods of tension and disagreement. Political or ideological factors might have an impact on optics, but not on the relationship itself. The current state of US-Israel relations provides an example of this. US President Joe Biden has made no secret of his distaste for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, just as former President Barack Obama did not disguise his opposition. Biden has been critical of Netanyahu and Israel, once angrily telling the Israeli leader to “stop bullshitting.” Biden’s leader in the US Senate, Charles Schumer, even called on Israelis to hold new elections in the middle of an existential war, and throw Netanyahu out of office. There even have been complaints from many in Israel and the United States that Biden slowed shipments of critical weapons to Israel. Both Obama and Biden did something never done before by abstaining in a United Nations (UN) Security Council vote on an anti-Israel resolution. It has been US policy ever since the UN became an anti-Israel mouthpiece to veto such things. Obama and Biden both, however, wanted to send a clear message to Israel. Sounds like a relationship in trouble, doesn’t it?
It’s not. Biden has a problem on his left flank—which he and his party cannot afford to ignore in this election year; and it’s significant that Biden’s criticism of Israel and Netanyahu seems to have evaporated since he announced that he was not running for re-election. The left in the United States like elsewhere is for the most part anti-Israel and bleeds for the Palestinians, even those who engaged in or supported the Nazi-like atrocities they committed against Israelis on October 7, 2023. And as I noted above, the United States is a democracy; their elections bring to office people with different positions and constituencies to satisfy. Things get messy in democracies in which we cannot—and I hope do not want—to suppress views we do not like or have a single-party state. Optics aside, however, these spats did not stop the US from continuing to supply Israel with needed weapons; nor did it stop the US from participating (along with several Arab nations and, of course, Israel) in stopping the massive Iranian missile strike on Israel in April 2024. At the time of this writing, we do not know whether or how Iran will carry out its threatened attack on Israel; nevertheless, the United States has deployed numerous military assets in the region to help defend Israel from any Iranian attack. Does that sound like a relationship in trouble?
It does not, and India is on something of a parallel course. The same quarters who dislike Netanyahu dislike Modi as much and would love to see the US cut ties with both of them. They are almost exclusively on the left, although anti-Modi forces have some supporters on the Evangelical Christian right. My own analysis is that many in the West like their Jews and Hindus passive and subservient; and both men are leading their nations, which are associated with those two faiths, in efforts of strength and national renewal and independence. I was in Washington for Modi’s address to the US Congress, and there were large numbers of protestors calling for his ouster and accusing him of extensive and ongoing human rights violations; although more were there in support of him, as was the case with Netanyahu. This is the same drumbeat you hear from the same activists about Israel and Netanyahu. Leftist Members of Congress boycotted the speeches of both foreign leaders, though many more boycotted Netanyahu than Modi. But, as with US-Israel relations, look at action not words. The vast majority of American geopolitical analysts and policy makers realize and often talk about the critical role India plays along with the United States in stopping the axis of authoritarianism, and especially China and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). As the US continues to cut its imports of Chinese goods, India is filling part of that gap and supplanting China in some American market segments. A clear majority of Americans see India (and Israel) as a friend and ally; as a people who represent a great civilization. So, India should not be worried about that sort of ideological activity; look instead at the solidary actions. Yes, former President Donald Trump was much closer with and fonder of Modi than Biden or Vice President and Democratic presidential nominee Kamala Harris are. But regardless of who is elected President in November, and despite any statements critical of India, the US-India reliance will remain strong.
It would be a mistake, however, to completely discount any fragility in the US-India relationship. Though never enemies, the two countries have had some difficult history. During the Cold War, India committed the cardinal sin for Americans of embracing the Soviet Union and remaining distant from and even opposing the US on global matters. During that same time, the United States supported Pakistan, a cardinal sin in Indian eyes, and shared responsibility for the worst environmental disaster ever, in the Union Carbide chemical spill in Bhopal. So, this bad history still lingers for a dwindling number of people in both countries.
4. India-China relations are unlikely to see much progress in the coming times Do you agree?
As the Chinese economy—and pretty much everything else associated with that country continues its decline, and India’s fortunes continue their rise, Chinese leaders and the Chinese Communist Party will have to figure out how to live with that new reality. Chinese leaders still retain their goals of controlling sea lanes and trade routes through Asia and between Asia and Europe. Its Belt & Road Initiative might be failing at this point, with new investments unlikely as the economy and capital decline; but the CCP has not backed off its international sabre rattling with regard to Taiwan, its stated aim of replacing the US and the dollar as the world’s economic leader, or its aggressive activity in the nations that surround India: military bases and power centers (from land grabs in Nepal and Bhutan), friendly governments, and ports from Gwadar in Pakistan (i.e., Balochistan), to Hambantota in Sri Lanka to, and eventually Chittagong in Bangladesh, if China has its way with the new Bangladeshi junta. We need to follow closely how China might look to seize on the current unrest and lack of clear leadership in Bangladesh to complete its “string of pearls.” That is, there is a period between now and later in this century, during which CCP actions are a little less predictable because its material situation is changing more rapidly than its leaders’ ability to react to those changes.
And that’s a major point to take from this: what happens in the India-China relationship is going to depend more on China’s action than India’s. There is little doubt that demographic and economic forces are combining so that India will take over China’s position as Asia’s dominant power. It’s hard to see what China will see in India to buttress its current position, help it expand its influence, or even make it possible for China to take over Taiwan. If anything, Chinese leaders are far more likely to see India as an obstacle to its goals, especially as India’s own reach strengthens and its role in the democratic alliance grows.
5. There's no such thing as "strategic autonomy" in times of conflict. Do you agree?
Well, we saw that in action after Russia invaded Ukraine. Ever since former President Donald Trump came to office in 2017, many in the European Union (EU) urged the group of nations to move to a level of strategic autonomy and become less dependent on the United States. But Ukraine needed the joint help of the western world nations, and the United States largely called the shots. Besides being Ukraine’s biggest weapons supplier, the US often manufactured the weapons supplied by the Europeans. In fact, EU and US leaders touted the coalition that they built to take unified action in the conflict. On the other side of the war, Russia would have been forced long ago to abandon its Ukraine adventure were it not for the supplies of weapons and other needed goods it continues to get from China and Iran. It could not and cannot operate in a vacuum independent of those allies. Strategic Autonomy is the concept of a State pursuing its national interests without heavy reliance on other States. Throughout the pages of this and other FPRC journals, I wrote about India’s growing ability to act in its interests even if it angers others with whom it has alliances. But in times of conflict, things do not work out that way. The current Israel-Hamas (really Israel vs. Iran and it proxies) War provides another example. There is a strong sense in Israel that in the end, it has to be able to take needed defensive action regardless of who doesn’t like it. The extent to which that is possible, however, changes in a conflict. There is little doubt that Israel already would have completed its destruction of Hamas were it not for the restraining force of the United States. For instance, the US opposed Israel’s planned operation in Rafah, Gaza that would have destroyed the terror group’s last fighting battalions. The US requested meeting after meeting with the Israelis and demanded endless provisions for Gaza civilians before finally relenting. As a result, Hamas operatives and leaders were able to use the delay to escape the area and continue fighting in other parts of Gaza so that Israel has had to engage in conflicts elsewherein Gaza that previously had been cleared of Hamas. Be that as it may, I have not heard any Israelis thereby criticize the government, telling it that it should have ignored the United States. Nor should anyone think for a moment that Israel is not considering the needs of its Arab allies during the conflict. If it did not, the strains could have fractured an alliance that remains strong during the conflict. Ultimately, its peace depends on how keeping these other Arab nations as allies.
A case can be made for the world today being in a constant state of conflict. We can cite the overarching conflict between democracy and authoritarianism for global dominance or the regular and ongoing hot wars that have implications for that struggle and the nations that lead it. That suggests that strategic autonomy is difficult to maintain at any time, and it makes sense if we do not view strategic autonomy as an either/or proposition. Rather, we should think of strategic autonomy in terms of degree; and we have laid out a convincing case of how India fits into that conceptualization, for instance, strongly allying with the US but remaining one of Russia’s biggest energy importers. China certainly appears to act independent of other nations, however, it cannot do so without reckoning with the economic disaster that would ensue if western nations respond by reducing, eliminating, or placing high tariffs on Chinese goods. We must re-think the concept of strategic autonomy as a continuum, and one on which we all find ourselves differently placed at different times. A debate has been raging in the United States for some time. Since the Second World War, the US has been the major player in international efforts pretty constantly. Yet, our country was born with a strong principle to, as expressed by our first President George Washington, “avoid foreign entanglements.” That isolationist frame of mind among many Americans was the primary factor that delayed the United States’ entry into both world wars. In fact, sentiment against joining World War II remained high until the 1941 Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. That isolationist sentiment remains strong among a segment of the American public today and has hampered, for instance, continued US aid to Ukraine. For those advocates, isolationism is the sine qua non of strategic autonomy.
The argument against this position is that regardless of how powerful our military, how strong our economy, how right our democratic principles; we cannot ignore other nations in today’s world. As we saw on September 11, 2001, the two great oceans on either side of us no longer provide the same protection they did through the first 40 years of the 20th century. All of us worldwide are interconnected in ways that determine the quality of our lives. We cannot operate without being dependent on others—whether they have critical markets for our products, are sources of goods we want or need; or whether they are friend or foe. We ignore that in the name of Strategic Autonomy at our own risk.