https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Q2HoBVII8RMbAQKwYjrYU9P9ZV1JwFXn/view
By. Dr. Richard L. Benkin
The latest issue of India-based Foreign Policy Research Centre (FPRC) has been published. The issue contains online interviews with questions about India and its "turbulent neighborhood." FPRC is an excellent institution, founded by Prof. Mahendra Gaur, and is opening a school focused on India and foreign affairs. I'm proud to be part of it. My answer addresses how India's neighborhood relations must be seen now within the context of India's rise as a global superpower; and that as an American, I'm familiar with how a superpower is understood by other nations (sometimes for the better, sometimes for the worse). My section of the FPRC journal is on pages 23-29.
Dr. Richard L. Benkin, Independent Human Rights Activist, Advisor Foreign Policy School(BHARAT) https://fpsbharat.com/
1. Why are most South Asian states skeptical of India’s primacy in their own ways?
In a basic way, this is the same skepticism and distrust Latin American states have for the United States
(US, USA), East Asian states have toward China, and East European states have toward Russia. Part of
this comes from the fact that the USA, China, Russia, and yes, India, have to one extent or another
attempted to dominate neighboring nations, through both aid and direct or indirect power politics or
economics. India’s rise to superpower status, which will continue growing throughout this century,
requires its leaders and citizens to recognize that being a superpower comes with its own considerable
amount of baggage. As an American, I can testify to that. This is not to suggest that great regional
powers are solely victims of jealousy. Parochial interests and regional demands come together as
regional powers make strategic decisions. Sometimes those powers get it right, sometimes not. The
power discrepancy between those countries and others in their neighborhoods can and at times does
spark resentment by others and creates a prism made of personal interest and a sense of entitlement
at times by the powers themselves. No country can claim 100 percent infallibility, and great power
errors get magnified and used for propaganda when they occur.
When you are at the top of the heap, there always will be people who love to criticize you or take you
down, no matter how counterintuitive or wrongheaded, and apply double standards to what you do. In
addition, nations with significant power (military, economic, ideological) cannot escape being
classified in one or another ideological category with geopolitical implications. India, for instance, is
grouped solidly with the democratic coalition in its struggle with the authoritarian coalition. Peoples
living in great democracies like India, will see this as something good; but at the same time, those
nations who look to the other coalition for support will describe it as neo-colonial, fascist, and contrary
to so-called people’s revolutions. India has moved from a soft socialist economy to a capitalist one that
emphasizes growth and opportunity; and while that might be good for the Indian people, others see it
as unfair to groups that cannot compete in a meritocracy. Closer to home, India was roundly criticized
for repealing the special status of Jammu-Kashmir and repealing Section307. None of those who
attacked India’s actions ever mentioned that 307 was instituted as temporary or applied the same
invective to, for example, Spain for not giving its Basque or Catalan states special status; China for not
doing the same for Uighurs in Xingyang; or Russia for ignoring Siberia’s special status. Nor did they
mention the violent expulsion of Kashmiri Pandits that changed the demographic facts on the ground.
The examples are too numerous to list, and I would wager that if India helps Sri Lanka or Maldives avoid
major concessions to China in exchange for debt relief, or helps Nepal and Bhutan even the playing
field in their attempts to stave off Chinese land grabs, many will see these actions of support for weak
neighbors as “Indian meddling.” Know also that India’s previous actions—whether undertaken
primarily with good will, self-interest, or most often a combination of both—will be used by different
parties with their own interests to try to fit them into their ideological or self-interested constructs. It
comes with superpower territory. Superpowers like India must understand them for what they are
worth and act accordingly in its own, expanded set of interests; rather than allow them to tie up
progress and needed geopolitical actions.
A good example of India doing that well involves Israel’s defensive war in Gaza. While pundits and
politicians globally refer to the “Global South,” and how those nations favor Palestinians and Iran over
Israel; they always make sure to include “except India,” which remains a strong ally of Israel’s. And
instead of trying to make those critics feel better (which will not happen because the criticism is rooted
in ideologies that seek an end to a strong India); the Modi government has not wavered in its principled
policy and held firm to the benefit of the people it serves. The example that India is setting enables
other nations of the Global South to make ethical and geopolitical decisions based on the facts of the
cases, rather than being forced to follow some faux interpretation of global intersectionality; that is,
India’s example helps other countries put facts and their people’s interests above forced ideological
demands.
2. Besides China’s assertive behavior, political and economic instability in “turbulent neighbourhood”
is a cause for concern for India. Do you agree?
Political and economic instability is never a good thing for nations and others who wish to see a
continuation of existing structures and power relations. Given the hard-won benefits current conditions
are yielding for the people of India, instability in the neighborhood does indeed pose a threat. All but
a few of India’s neighbors suffer from some level of instability. While facing some, but not enormous,
civil rights challenges, Bhutan seems to be navigating successfully from a traditional monarchy to a
constitutional monarchy with a democratic republic. This does not include, however, its continued
persecution of Nepali Hindus, which remains a serious issue that, unfortunately, the world ignores. The
major threat to its stability is the Chinese pressure to cede territory that could become a battleground
between democracy and authoritarianism, India and China. Nepal, it seems, has never known political
stability as a modern state. It faced a dogged communist insurgency and the 2008 abdication of King
Gyanendra Bir Bikram Shah Dev, and since then, not a single Nepali government has served out its full
term. In the 2023 election, the democratic socialist Nepali Congress was the to vote getter, but it the
second and third place finishers were both communist; and if these two parties (Communist Party of
Nepal-Unified Marxist-Leninist and Communist Party of Nepal Maoist Center). Initially, the Maoists
joined Nepali Congress in a coalition in the Saṅghīya Sansada Nēpāla (Nepali parliament). Less than a
year later, it broke with Congress and formed a new ruling coalition with the Marxists. There is no end
in sight for Nepal’s weak governments, which also are dealing with Chinese land seizures. India could
help both Bhutan and Nepal in maintaining their territorial integrity against Chinese aggression and by
neutralizing the external threat, help both countries achieve a measure of internal stability. That also
would help establish Indian dominance (vis-à-vis China) in Asia in general, South Asia in particular.
Sri Lanka did not emerge from its bitter civil war until 2009. With roots in the 1950s, the conflict was
between the majority Sinhalese and the Island’s largest minority group, Tamils. A Tamil insurrection
began in the 1980s even requiring an Indian Peacekeeping force a times. The conflict was marked, on
the one hand, with credible charges of genocide against the Sinhalese, and on the other, the Tamil
movement led by a group designated as terrorists by 33 countries, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
(LTTE), also known as the Tamil Tigers. From then until 2022, except for a four-year hiatus, the Sri
Lankan government was controlled by a single family, the Rajapaksas. But it would be a mistake to
conclude that this equated to social stability. Unresolved ethnic conflicts remained, and in 2019, a new
Islamist force began carrying out suicide bombings. That same year saw the Lankan economy start to
unravel and brought the population soaring prices (inflation continues to top 50 percent), essential
goods shortages, power outages, and crippling international debts. The latter included $7 billion to
China, the result of misbegotten attempts to modernize via China’s Belt & Road Initiative (BRI). Fuel
shortages led to schools being closed and people having to work from home. By 2022, the people had
enough, and Sri Lanka saw social unrest that continues to various extents to this day. At one point, things
were so bad that the government called in the military to restore order. At this point, the economic
catastrophe appears to have no end in sight, which means that India can expect serious instability
continue for its island neighbor.
The Maldives has had a series of national elections pitting candidates who were pro-Chinese against
candidates who were pro-India; thus making it something of a microcosm of the battle for supremacy
in Asia. In fact, until recently, Maldives had an “India First” policy in recognition of its giant neighbor.
In late April, however, pro-Chinese President Mohamed Muizzu won a landslide victory that gave his
People’s National Congress Party (PNC) a veto-proof majority in the parliament. It was a clear
repudiation of India, and even before the landslide victory, Muizzu began expelling the 85 Indian
troops there. That same month, he signed a military assistance pact with China. Muizzu, In addition to
free non-lethal weaponry, the pact has Chinese trainers replace the Indians and Americans who had
been training Maldivian troops. As significant as this is, however, Muizzu had India replace their troops
with civilian technicians, thereby maintaining some Indian presence. Given the immediate public
groundswell for the PNC and its pro-China stance, as well as significant Maldivian resentment of Indian
dominance, Bharat would do best at the moment to ride out the storm, and use its continued presence
to seize advantages on a pragmatic basis, and be a good friend to its archipelago neighbor.
Both Sri Lanka and Maldives owe billions of dollars to China, the product of misbegotten BRI projects.
India can play a key role in helping both nations find debt relief rather than repeat the Lankan handover
of Hambantota port to China. It can help them access international aid and loans, whether from global
bodies like the World Bank or individual nations; thereby getting both out from under crushing debt
and help them stabilize their troubled economies. But it will take both time and patience. These nations
occupy critical shipping lanes, which China covets and over which India must maintain control.
India’s biggest concern in this regard has to be Pakistan. There is extensive data supporting the
conclusion that Pakistan frequently flirts with the title of a “failed state.” Since its beginnings as a nation,
Pakistan has faced serious ethnic tensions within. The dominant Punjabis comprise less than half the
nation but maintains an ongoing policy that prohibits other ethnic languages in many settings, including
education, seizes valuable resources in ethnic areas, and has turned a blind eye when its own militias
or other terrorist groups attack these other groups. Pashtuns, Baloch, and Sindhis, who together make
up more than a third of Pakistan’s population are, at times, in open political revolt. The tensions,
moreover, have hampered BRI projects, which are key to Pakistan’s economic viability. Pakistan’s
patronization of terror groups, especially but not exclusively in and around Kashmir and in the
Northwest, operate with little or no limits, and undermine both the rule of law and a sense of security
among many Pakistanis. The country’s foreign debt is crushing, and interest payments alone will equal
almost 60 percent of Pakistan’s total revenue in 2024. The country is effectively a Chinese vassal state
that has allowed Chinese military vessels to take over its Gwadar port in Balochistan. Right now, the
only thing keeping the nation afloat is the infusion of cash from the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
There is some evidence that it has had some positive impact on Pakistan’s very high inflation though
inflation remains high. Even as a new government was sworn in (after months of political instability that
followed the ouster of an Islamist regime), the AP reported “an unprecedented economic crisis, regular
power cuts, near-daily militant attacks and a challenging relationship with neighboring Taliban-run
Afghanistan.
Any perceived improvements are small bandages at best on a massive wound, especially if Pakistan
remains tethered to China; and it’s hard to see how that changes. Relations with the United States and
the west have been at a nadir from the time they found out Pakistan was sheltering arch terrorist Osama
bin Laden; and as long at the state remains under the thumb of the military and intelligence agencies,
it is impossible to see it turn to India for help. Making all of this even more perilous for India and the
rest of the world is that no one can dismiss Pakistan, which avoided defaulting on its debts only through
a massive infusion of funds. It is currently the world’s fifth largest country, with annual population
increases eclipsing every country except India and Nigeria. Its annual population increase percentage
is about two and a half times India’s. So, it’s not going away. This nuclear state is strategically located
in one of the world’s hottest hot spots. The four countries on its borders—India, China, Iran, and
Afghanistan—are all geopolitical axes that have interests in what happens inside Pakistan. Will it
stabilize with help from the IMF and others? Will it continue moving more and more into China’s arms?
Or will it become so unstable and so rife with division that it ultimately breaks apart into separate
nations or a federation of semi-autonomous republics?
3. Why is India working on developing an “extended neighbourhood” that involves islands in the
Indian Ocean, Gulf countries and nations in South-East Asia? Is it for a bigger, influential and ambitious
India?
As India’s superpower status grows, a number of geopolitical factors will push it to abandon a more
parochial view of its interests, something that has been happening now for at least a decade. But I want
to focus on one in particular: the economy.
India will not achieve its potential unless it develops new markets for its exports. In the five years
between 2017 and 2022, the total value of Indian exports grew by over 50 percent to approximately
$468 Billion USD; and for a long time, its biggest export destination has been the United States. In fact,
the total exports to all countries in the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) that
year amounted to only 38 percent of exports to the USA. Moreover, the USA is not only India’s largest
export destination, according to the OEC, it’s also the fastest growing market. Even now, India’s
immediate neighborhood is woefully incapable of supporting India’s export economy, and even the
capacity for that is nowhere near what the Indian people need. If we look at IMF figures for GDP, we
come to the same conclusion. The IMF estimates of the total 2024 GDP for all SAARC countries, except
India, amount to less than a quarter of India’s GDP estimate. Moreover, almost half of it comes from one
country (Bangladesh). In other words, if we take Bangladesh out of the mix, India’s immediate
neighborhood together has a GDP less than one eighth the size of India’s. And India’s economic
appetite is only increasing. Bloomberg, S&P Global, and every other forecaster predict that by the
end of this decade, not far off, India will have the world’s third largest economy, eclipsing both Japan
and Germany; and it will begin flirting with a $10 Trillion USD GDP that year. India’s immediate
neighborhood simply does not have the capacity for India to support its citizens. Neighborhood
expansion is an imperative for India. For instance, nine out of the top 20 economies today are in what
is termed the Global South; five of the 20 are in East Asia and Australia; two in West Asia. So, there is a
lot of potential even near by India.
Narendra Modi should remain Prime Minister for almost the entire decade, which means we can expect
his “Make in India” focus to continue generating greater need for export markets. Several other trends
make market expansion even more of an imperative. In the five years between 2017 and 2022, the value
of Indian exports grew by over 50 percent—and all of these figures reflect the export of goods; service
exports draw an even more dramatic picture. Moreover, according to the Indian government, there
was a significant growth in exports from February 2023 to February 2024, and that growth was fueled
by increased imports to the United States, United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Singapore—no SAARC
countries were even mentioned. In fact, when the government reviewed its primary export
destinations, the only SAARC country mentioned was Bangladesh, which has experienced something
of an economic miracle over the past decade. We’re also seeing a decline in China’s exports, and that
trend will grow even more pronounced as the Chinese economy’s decline increases even more
precipitously as each year of China’s demographic disaster takes hold. While India is likely to remain
more of an agrarian society than an urban one for some time, it is seeing a decided trend toward
urbanization. From 2000 to 2020, India’s urban population grew by two thirds. The urban population
went from about a quarter of the population to over a third; and India is projected to add 100 million
more people to its urban population by the end of this decade. That means fewer Indians who can
subsist on agriculture and more who rely on manufacturing and the service economy for their survival.
The only way to support that is by gaining new markets, and the trend has been for India to supplant
others in the battle for consumer markets.
You cannot expect to be a major player in any nation’s economy unless you understand the priorities
and values of the buying population and succeed in creating a positive perception of you among them.
To support the latter point, look at the decline of China in the US economy as greater proportions of the
American population have strong negative perceptions of the Chinese government and the Chinese
Communist Party (not at all of the Chinese people). This requires an aggressive program globally and
in targeted areas. It is not a simple matter of low prices and a general sense of the market, which is
possible only if India expands its neighborhood focus. It cannot rely on its immediate neighbors, who
do not have the capacity, and a few markets far afield, like the USA, UAE, and few others. That would
make India vulnerable to geopolitics and buying patterns in those countries unless it diversifies its
export market portfolio.
4. New Delhi’s ability to deal with Washington and Beijing can be significantly enhanced if India
achieves greater strategic confidence in South Asian geopolitics. Do you agree?
Laying aside Americans’ valuing India for itself and the richness of its civilizational perspective, as well
as the increasing number of Indian immigrants who are contributing to the United States themselves
and through their decedents—Indians are now the largest Asian ethnic group in the United States—the
US values India for its economic dominance and potential for even greater heights; and for its
geopolitical importance, especially in being a bulwark against the expansion of China’s sphere of
influence. The former will continue to achieve new heights outside of a geopolitical perspective for the
reasons noted in the previous questions. The latter, however, is to some extent contingent on Indian
geopolitical dominance and leadership in South Asia. The extent to which India can turn all of South
Asia into a geopolitical bloc demonstrates its influence; the extent to which India cannot exert
significant control even its immediate neighborhood demonstrates its limits. That geopolitical control
is not the sine qua non for Indian influence, however, uniting often disparate elements shows
tremendous strength. This becomes even more critical given that gaps in that unity, right now, can very
well mean a Chinese foothold in the region.
The geopolitical significance cannot be overestimated: two nuclear armed states; one of the world’s
top economies; a region in which China has invested heavily and tied up a great deal of its wealth;
ongoing border disputes; and between one out of four and one of five people on the planet. To its East,
sits China and Southeast Asia; a volatile West Asia to its West; some of the world’s critical shipping
lanes; and to its North Russia and Central Asia. Add South Asia’s own hotspots to those surrounding it,
and it would be difficult to find a more strategically important area.
If we continue to define South Asia by the SAARC countries, the immense challenges that India faces in
presenting a united South Asian front become abundantly clear. While there have been a number of
signals coming from Afghanistan that its leaders desire some level of legitimacy among the community
of nations, it has not led them to expel Islamist terrorists who find safe haven within their borders. Nor
has the Taliban backed down from its retrograde and tyrannical oppression within its borders. From a
personal standpoint, I continue to work extensively with democracy advocates, people who support a
political landscape different from that imposed by the Taliban, and especially women’s rights activists.
Many of the last group not only face legalized rightlessness (and that is no hyperbole), but those who
have objected to their severe oppression have faced gestapo-like imprisonment and torture, including
sexual violence as severe as that suffered by Israeli women at the hands of Hamas. And there is
absolutely no sign that the Taliban would even consider changing that horrendous policy. Many people
in all of those Afghan groups have been brutalized and murdered by the Taliban as official policy they
consider to be in line with Sharia. Thus, it is difficult to see how India reigns in these excesses such that
Afghanistan can be part of one democratic geopolitical bloc—unless or until the Taliban and its ilk are
removed from power.
Pakistan’s integration into that same geopolitical bloc faces (perhaps) insurmountable challenges.
Pakistan’s debt crisis threatens to bring down the country, and the political instability that began to
resolve only recently has kept Pakistan from presenting an authoritative entity that could agree to
bailouts with the World Bank and other potential saviors. And a new government better get its act
together quickly, as a needed $3 Billion USD IMF bailout ran out in March. Right now, the IMF and credit
rating agencies estimate that the interest payments on that debt alone will eat up 50-60 percent of its
2024 income—income that is insufficient to service its citizens who have been facing shortages of fuel
and other essentials, as well near 30 percent inflation. At the same time, fully 30 percent of all the
foreign debt Pakistan has is owed to China. China is involved massively in Pakistan’s premier
infrastructure projects, all part of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). CPEC, by the way, is
arguably the most important of all China’s BRI efforts. Chinese military vessels use Pakistan’s Gwardar
warm water port, located in Balochistan, and Chinese money and workers have turned it from a
backwater into a high capacity and strategic port. It is located close to Iran on the Arabian Sea and
close to the Straits of Hormuz. It could be used by China or allies to choke off western oil supplies; or
at least increase the time required to ship them and in times of emergency, troops. It also significantly
shortens the time and distance needed to get Chinese material and materiel to the Middle East.
Moreover, the faltering Chinese economy makes it extremely unlikely that the Chinese government
will forgive Pakistani debt or release its grip on Pakistan’s geopolitical strategy. Compounding that,
Pakistan burned a lot of bridges with western nations that could help them replace Chinese debt with
loan repayment in line with the Paris Group, an organization of lender nations whose commitment is to
help borrower nations, not take advantage of them in way China does. My own assessment is that
eventually, things will change as the Chinese economy contracts and its geopolitical leverage wanes.
But with that not in the immediate offing, Pakistan like Afghanistan does not seem a candidate for a
South Asian geopolitical bloc.
As noted in my previous answers, however, India has a number of ways to bring the other South Asian
nations into a more cohesive geopolitical bloc, which is not to say that it is without significant
challenges. Nepal and Bhutan are fighting border disputes, and China is trying to force resolutions that
further its strategic interests. If India helps these weaker neighbors withstand bullying from Beijing, it
will signal a geopolitical alliance with India making it happen. The Maldives and Sri Lanka have major
economic problems and owe much of their foreign debt to China. With the help of India and the United
States, Sri Lanka already has accessed non-predatory funds to help it reduce its debt to China and
stabilize its economy in crisis. The Maldives faces a similar situation in its debt with China, but its
population has responded by replacing a President who was looking for an alternative to its current
debt, with an openly pro-China President. With that, we should expect to see Maldivian foreign policy
to fall in line with China’s geopolitical positions. For instance, just days before the writing of this answer,
President Muizzu announced that the Maldives are banning all Israeli Jews from the country in solidarity
with the Palestinians, Hamas, and the China-Russia-Iran bloc. We should see more such moves,
however, Maldivian democracy could install a pro-western government in the next election. Perhaps
whether or not it does will be an important indicator of how strong India is in its immediate
neighborhood.
If India is successful in guiding South Asian geopolitics—especially if something happens to change the
dynamics in Pakistan and Afghanistan—it will lead a bloc so formidable and so strategically critical,
that neither Washington nor Beijing will be able to ignore its importance to them.
5. The Indian government’s policy of diplomatically isolating Pakistan does not seem to be succeeding
as Islamabad has stepped up its diplomatic efforts to engage Beijing, Moscow, and Tehran. How far is
it true?
(I first refer to my paragraphs about Pakistan in answer to Question #2.) And yes, in many respects,
Pakistan has joined the Beijing-Moscow-Tehran axis, while India is firmly ensconced in the democratic
axis with the United States and Europe. At the same time, Pakistan is getting massive help from the
western-oriented IMF—which at least for now is in India’s strategic interests as well. India did not object
to the bailouts and for good reason. Left to its own devices, Pakistan does a good enough job itself of
alienating the West without India’s help. Its open embrace of the Chinese dominated axis and closeness
to it through the China-Pakistan Economic corridor; its decades of double dealing with the west on
critical geopolitical issues; its sale of nuclear technology and its role in trying to spread it; its pretend
democracy; and its ongoing support of terror and ties with terror leaders; has done more than India
has done or could do to end western support for Pakistan. Pakistan, however, is both a nuclear state
that is additionally located at strategic pressure points with major geopolitical importance. As such, the
West cannot stand by while Pakistan fails and so has facilitated the IMF bailouts and other fixes.
What has changed is that world leaders no longer speak of India-Pakistan conflict but of India-China
competition. That does not “isolate” Pakistan but marginalizes it as a force and severely reduces its
leverage over international events. Pakistan (with the possible but unlikely inclusion of Nigeria) is the
only country among the ten largest that does not have political or economic stability. Even if
democracies now find relations with Pakistan distasteful, the potential consequences of a fall due to its
economic and political crises would have global consequences, thereby making isolation rather
difficult to envision as viable, and making this “marginalization” policy far more effective in serving
India’s and the democratic axis’s geopolitical interests. If Pakistan fails, by for example defaulting on
its substantial loans, depending on when it does, the Chinese economy likely would be in no position
to right the ship. It its own economy and demographic disasters looming and already at work. Can
India, the United States and their allies be the only force capable of fixing the problem? And if so, will
that democratic access be strong enough to demand geopolitical compliance with their interests in
exchange (e.g., crackdown on terror groups, reigning in the ISI and its associated groups, relinquish
control over its nuclear arsenal to prevent it selling nuclear proliferation)? Or will Pakistan fall prey a
massive terror offensive from Iran, leaving India with a major terror state on its borders? Given
Pakistan’s fragility and its potential for becoming a failed state, isolating it from friendly life rafts is not
in India’s interests either.