This quarter's edition of India's Foreign Policy Research Center journal has been published. It focuses on what Modi's current (and maybe his final) term in office will look like. My section, which appears on pp. 23-30, focuses on India and the United States, and the global struggle between democracy, capitalism, and freedom on the one hand, and authoritarianism, socialism/communism, and state slavery on the other. Enjoy.
1. What has been India’s achievement on the global stage in the last ten years 2014-2024?
I recall having a conversation with people involved in then Gujurat Chief Minister Narendra Modi’s first campaign for national office in 2014. His opponents in the Congress Party and their allies were raising 2002 and Modi’s oft-alleged but frequently debunked role in Gujurat’s communal riots, attempting to paint him as a cold-blooded murderer. At the time I said that the leaders of Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) should be glad about that since it was unlikely that more than a few, if any, Indian voters had not yet made up their minds about 2002, one way or another. I might have had a point as the charge obviously did not prevent a landslide Modi victory. Moreover, while there are still people around the globe who view Modi (falsely) as some sort of monster and human rights abuser, they are a minority and do not include national leaders or policy makers. But this does illustrate that before Modi’s agenda of transforming India’s global position could be implemented, he had to fight that perception and a concerted effort on the (soft and not-so-soft) left, no less than did former Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon before him (in relation to Phalange killings in Lebanon’s Sabra and Chatilla Palestinian camps) and former and future United States (US) President Donald Trump since (regarding charges that he led an insurrection on January 6, 2021). Changing that view of the Indian Prime Minister, and consequently the Indian m asses that elected him overwhelmingly, was Modi’s first achievement. It enabled him to create new geopolitical alignments that forever changed the way other nations perceived India, the way India perceived itself, and India’s role in the world.
While I often focus on how India transformed its role in the world into that of a superpower whose actions cannot be dismissed or taken lightly, I want to call out as one of the clearest signs of that change is who the world sees as India’s greatest global adversary. Prior to Modi’s taking the reins of power, most people talked about Pakistan as India’s primary rival. After all, it had been an intense and emotionally-charged rivalry for decades. The two had four major wars since gaining independence in 1947, and at least a dozen skirmishes and border incidents. After the Pakistani planned and sponsored 26/11 terror attack in Mumbai in 2008, the world held its collective breadth in fear of a nuclear war between the two South Asian powers.
Things are nothing like that now. If people are concerned about Pakistan’s nukes, it is fear over what might happen to them if Pakistan disintegrates or if its military and ISI intelligence forces decide to sell them to the highest bidder in order to solve its dire financial problems. The previous, UPA and Congress-led Indian government was fearful of acting against Pakistan even when it had good reason to do so. I recall surveying a range of international sources after 26/11, and there was wide agreement that India would be justified in launching pinpoint strikes against the terrorist camps inside Pakistan; but India held its fire. For years afterwards, it tried to raise the issue with Pakistan but never could. I recall being in India one year during UPA rule, when India and Pakistan were supposed to meet and Pakistani involvement in 26/11 was to be at the top of the agenda. Just before the meeting, however, Pakistan told India that it would meet only if 26/11 was not discussed. But rather than telling Pakistan that its conditions were unacceptable and making clear that there would be offering consequences of their cancelling the meeting, India meekly demurred. If that frustrated me, I can only imagine how it angered the people of India. Perhaps that anger was part of why they rejected Congress resoundingly in 2014. It took but a few incidents following Modi’s election for Pakistan to know that “there was a new sheriff in town” who was not going to pursue the same weak policy as his predecessor. After that, Pakistan’s provocative action was limited to often indirect attacks in Kashmir. Whether you call it strength through deterrence or escalating to de-escalate, that is what works against anti-democratic bullies.
Following Prime Minister Modi’s election victory, the two nations went in polar opposite directions. India proceeded to become a world superpower and a dominant figure at numerous international forums and organizations. It also has been prominent with the G7, being invited multiple times; and as a key part of the G20, hosting its 2023 event in New Delhi and elsewhere in India. Pakistan has not been considered important enough to be part of either, despite it being one of only nine countries with nuclear weapons. In fact, Pakistan objected to 2023 G20 meetings in Kashmir, but the G20 proceeded with them nonetheless. At the same time as its geopolitical rise, India grew to become a world economic giant. Since Modi took office, India surpassed France, the United Kingdom (UK), Brazil, the Russian Federation, and Italy; and is now the world’s fifth largest economy by GDP. According to International Monetary Fund (IMF) projections, India will pass Japan and move into fourth place by 2026 and surpass Germany to claim the world’s third largest GDP by 2028.
While India was doing all that, Pakistan declined in significance severely. While India moved from 10th place to fifth among world economies, Pakistan remained mired at 43rd place, and is projected to drop to 46th when India becomes the world’s third largest economy. It is widely recognized that the Pakistani economy is in shambles and this year had to be bailed out with a $7 billion USD IMF loan. Aside from that, the country’s economy is dependent on billions in Chinese money, with the latter desperately struggling to save the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), its Belt and Road Initiative’s premier project. But instead of bringing China the influence and facility it expected from the project, CPEC has been beset with problems, not the least of which is that of resurgent among Pakistan’s constituent ethnic groups that one day could spell the end of that country as we know it. Despite the façade of a democratic government, Pakistan is run by a combination of the military and the ISI, the latter recognized by many nations as an enabler of terror groups and the force behind Pakistan’s safe haven for Osama bin Laden. At this point, Pakistan is little more than a Chinese vassal state.
China, not Pakistan is India’s acknowledged rival today. The two nations have had several border skirmishes with India holding its own or even besting the Chinese, and the two have struggled over Chinese attempts to secure territorial advantages in neighboring Nepal and Bhutan. When China announced that it was renaming several locations in India’s Arunachal Pradesh with Chinese names; India announced it was doing the same in Tibet. Their battle has become one of equals at this point. With China suffering from a collapsing economy and demographic disaster, its once-dominant position in Asia is at best a rivalry with India. Recent evidence that it has been selling weapons to Russia to help fuel its Ukraine invasion makes it a real possibility that American actions after Donald Trump takes office as President, will push its teetering economy over the edge. (Trump came close to doing so with a mild trade war during his first term.) The question today is not who will emerge victorious, India or Pakistan, but how long China will be a dominant Asian power before India overtakes it. That might very well be the India’s most significant geopolitical change in the Modi era.
What are the opportunities available for India in playing a significant role in world affairs?
The opportunities that India can seize once the new US administration under President Donald Trump takes office are game-changing. Together, Modi and Trump can craft a new order in Asia with India as the continent’s dominant power.
Even before Trump’s convincing 2024 victory, foreign companies had been fleeing China is significant numbers. The primary factors were China’s economic decline and increasing geopolitical tensions, especially between China and the United States. The prospect of a second Trump administration has only intensified both factors. The capital exodus from China is proceeding at a terrific pace, and several attempted incentives by Chinese President Xi Jinping have fallen flat. Making matters worse, more and more European leaders have become convinced that the accusations of China now providing Russia with weapons are true. That has led to a flurry of activity, especially since the Trump victory; and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz confronted Xi about this development at the recent Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Lima, Peru.
Quite a few years ago, while people fretted openly about China’s economic ascent, I frequently opined that it would be but temporary. China’s economy is “house of cards,” I would advise people. It economic model is unsustainable. Specifically, China’s economic well-being was dependent on the individual buying decisions made by millions of people whose interests do not align with China and ultimately see China as an adversary. At this point, distrust of China and the understanding that its actions are designed to undermine US interests is pretty much baked into the American psyche on both the political left and right. The Congressional Select Committee on the Strategic Competition between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party is one of the few examples of true bi-partisanship among Democrats and Republicans. China’s moves to help its ally Russia in its misbegotten Ukraine invasion is furthering the same attitudes in Europe. The United States and Europe are the very locations on which the Chinese economy depended on those friendly buying decisions. China, you fooled the West for a while, but no more. Your geopolitical delusions of grandeur, provocative actions and self-serving economic policies have led to your losing the markets and investors on which you depended.
To be sure, many of those companies have re-patriated to the United States in order to avoid supply chain interruptions and the potential tariffs that Trump promised before, during, and since the campaign. The number one destination for those fleeing companies, however, is India. We can be confident that many Indian leaders—and certainly Trump ally Modi—have a more sophisticated insight into Donald Trump’s worldview and what he wants to accomplish in his second term. And that is where the US can support India in transforming Asia and its position on that continent.
Most people at this point—whether they love Donald Trump or hate him—realize that he prioritizes winning the competition with China over almost all other matters. At the same time, he has been equally clear that he is trying to move US foreign policy away from its heavy dependence (along with attendant costs and, more importantly, deaths) on the US having an active presence in every hotspot and potential hotspot on the globe. If we think about India’s increasing power position—and not incidentally the excellent working relationship between Trump and Modi—India provides the way to merge those two goals. It makes a lot of sense for India to request, for instance, a free trade agreement with the United States, in exchange for being the power that puts a halt to China’s attempted expansion to its West. The US, as a result, can focus on China’s attempted expansion to its east, working with East Asian allies like Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines. There’s tremendous potential for US-India cooperation to help boost India’s superpower status, and with Modi and Trump leaving office around the same time, the two world leaders are perfectly synched for years of a strong US-India alliance that will outlive both of them.
3. What are the challenges ahead for India in managing its strategic ambitions?
Moving from a world “power” to “superpower”—which is what India is doing—changes the way other nations perceive you, and makes you a regular target of others’ envy. So far, India seems to be doing a good job of putting such things into perspective and not letting them derail its foreign policy agenda—so far. The challenge is to continue doing that: not dismissing the vitriol (whether factually correct or not), but not giving it legs that would enable it to dissuade India from actions that are in its interests. There always are bumps in the road of any revolutionary change like this, and its opponents and naysayers generally are quick to pronounce the entire enterprise wrong or even evil. A nation must not allow them to dissuade them from fidelity to the goal.
India is and will be facing several challenges, which should be expected by a nation on the ascent to superpower status. Over the next several years, one of the biggest will be for India to insist (and not waver in its insistence) that it become a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). That it deserves no less should be very clear. It hardly matters which dimension we use to assess India’s importance, they all lead us to the same conclusion. With the exception of swapping Communist China for Nationalist China in 1971, the UNSC hierarchy was set after World War II to include the three victorious powers (United States, Soviet Union, United Kingdom), and the two nations that were the focus of fascist occupation (France and China) in Europe and Asia respectively. The aggregation was an attempt to secure post-war power relationships. The later China swap was largely a function of US rapprochement with Communist China, and its attendant recognition of new power relationships. It is time for another recognition of reality.
As noted above, India’s economy has surpassed all but two of the current UNSC permanent members. Its central position along several key trade routes multiplies the import of India’s strategic economic strength several times. Additionally, it is difficult to see when India’s growing economic strength will end (whereas that is not the case for all of the UNSC permanent members save the United States). In 2020, a CNN report referring to the 1962 Sino-India War that ended in a Chinese victory, noted “the militaries that face off in the Himalayas today are far different from those that fought 58 years ago.” It touted Indian superiority in high altitude and mountainous fighting, which is where most India-China conflicts transpire today. Moreover, most international ratings and analysis give India an edge over both France and the UK, although a conflict between India and either of those countries is unlikely in the extreme. Any a realistic assessment of the UNSC situation must note that UNSC members got their seats not long after the British ended their “ownership” of India; and that the world which gave rise to those seats has long passed. India’s challenge is to continue to press its advantage to obtain that seat, even if its strongest allies protest. As a citizen of one of them, I can tell you that they would not sacrifice their good relations with India by drawing a line in the sand against India’s permanent seat on the UNSC.
The final challenge addressed here (there are a lot more) has to do with internal US politics. It has been clear for a long time that India finds its strongest American supporters on the right side of the political divide, whereas the left tends to coalesce around issues that reject Indian (and for that matter American or Israeli) dominance. Yet, there is a problem for some on the right, and that is the frequent claim that India persecutes Christians. As someone very close to the ground in India, I can say unequivocally that the claims are baseless. Do Indian Christians ever face violence? Of course, they do, as do minorities pretty much everywhere. But the charge that the Indian government does nothing to stop it is contrary to extensive evidence. Because it is an article of faith on the left, it sticks.
The problem for India is that many US politicians depend on support from fundamentalist Christians who represent a very important voting bloc for Republicans; and concerns about India and Christians arise with some regularity causing some on the right to withhold their unequivocal support for India. As we look forward to new Republican leadership starting in 2025, India would do well to provide a mechanism for demonstrating its opposition to anti-Christian persecution. I have suggested aninformal but serious liaison who can bring specific accusations to India’s attention and have them investigated and resolved—and I am guessing that most resolutions will point to existing India actions that resolved the matter or brought perpetrators to justice. We might be uncomfortable seeming to give our accusers even that much validity, but this would be an effective way to solidify a host of US-India joint actions.
4. Can India manage its international stature amidst regional instability, including its relationship with China?
People throw around the words, instability and destabilize, a bit too easily, almost as a knee-jerk response to strong action. Considering that the region includes Afghanistan and Pakistan, which have not been stable in recent memory and export that instability; referring to regional stability is at best a chimera, at worst a delusion. And now we can add Bangladesh with its post-coup chaos and ethnic cleansing to the mix. “Regional stability” is a false reference for assessing regional actions, just as it is when used by partisans who want to stop Israeli self-defense actions in the Middle East. India faces the same onslaught from the diplomatic corps, media, and other interested parties.
At some point, there will be a reckoning for Pakistan. It could come when China no longer can afford to subsidize its failing economy and CPEC, and that day is rapidly approaching, especially if incoming Trump Administration renews its trade war with China in 2025; something that all observers do not see the Chinese economy surviving. It could happen if Pakistan’s restive minority nationalities start conducting insurgencies or place China in the dock as the world’s biggest occupier of others. Or it might happen when its struggling economy finally fails. Pakistan is the fifth largest country in the world, but its nominal GDP is only the 161st largest, and as noted above, it had to be bailed out by the IMF recently. The Trump Administration could very well block further loans with Pakistan’s history of sheltering anti-US terrorists, most notably Osama Bin Laden, and recent revelations of its use of US tax dollars to encourage illegal immigration to the United States. When it all comes tumbling down, India could very well be the nation best positioned to step in and bring true stability to Pakistani territory through any number of actions.
Things remain chaotic inside Afghanistan, despite the Taliban’s despotic regime. Afghans continue to buckle at its restrictions and its violence against women and others who do not conform to their narrow interpretation of Islam. At what point, will the people rise up, and will the expected fall of the mullahs in Iran be the spark that ignites that conflagration? Whenever it happens, India, Pakistan, and Iran all should have ambitions (though for the latter two, not necessarily the ability) to play a major role in what comes next.
It is too soon to know how things will shake out in Bangladesh, but it is clear that the country will not regain its footing without India. The international media and others have tried to say that former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s ouster came about because of her job reservations for families of 1971 freedom fighters. That’s nonsense. They had been in place for decades and were no more than the most obvious cause the students raised during the pre-coup protests. Something more basic changed for the people. For several years prior to the coup, Bangladesh experienced something of an economic miracle, with GDP growth outstripping most countries in the world. But several months before the coup that growth stopped and started going into reverse. A lot of people lost their jobs, and the overall economy stopped generating the level of income it had been previously.
When people’s bellies are full and they see a bright future for their children, they’ll put up with a lot. Bangladesh’s economic miracle came with a price tag: inflation. During the boom, however, the inflation was not burdensome for the millions of Bangladeshis who were benefitting from the economic activity. It was only when that stopped, and people lost their jobs or had to close their businesses, that existing inflation became more than they could tolerate. The other cost was Sheikh Hasina turning Bangladesh, as several people described it do me, into a “one-party democracy.” Students and professors complained to me that “there is no free speech in Bangladesh.” Police at various levels and in numerous locations told me that they were ordered not to bring cases against Awami League cadres and officials. And people felt obliged to praise their leader, often while looking over their shoulder for any one of the near-ubiquitous informers who would report any lack of enthusiasm to authorities. But times were good and people had money in their pockets so they put up with it, even while griping about it. But when the flow of money stopped, that passivity stopped. Things that were tolerable before no longer were, and we saw them culminate in a coup on August 5, 2024. This means that whoever emerges to lead Bangladesh once the military allows elections, will have to fix the economy as their top job. If they don’t, they will be tossed out of office as surely as Sheikh Hasina was. And they cannot rebuild their economy without India, which during the boom became Bangladesh’s most important economic partner. While anti-India sentiment has been loud from certain quarters since the coup, the leaders of all factions vying for ultimate control know that they will not survive without India. Or, for that matter, the United States, which is Bangladesh’s top country destination for its garment and textile exports on which that economy depends. If anything, Bangladesh’s current instability only enhances India’s importance in the end.
In addition, India’s growing international stature actually benefits from its competition with China. It helps identify India as a serious candidate to be the dominant power in Asia, a topic that I have covered above and in previous interviews with the Foreign Policy Research Center. Moreover, India is winning the competition. Demographics alone doom the Chinese model for economic growth, as does its misbegotten Belt & Road loans (which assumed a flow of capital that has evaporated), antagonistic approach to most of its neighbors, its collapsed real estate market, and the exodus of foreign companies (many of which are not starting to re-locate in India) and capital. With its relationship with China, Indian leaders are making the point that their nation has joined the United States as the only country powerful enough to be a check on Chinese ambitions by itself.
5. What will or should be New Delhi’s foreign policy look under Modi 3.0?
India is in a unique position as part of the loose coalition of democracies that stand strong in opposing authoritarianism. The rest of coalition leadership is largely white and western. India, on the other hand, also represents the Global South, non-white peoples, and nations with aspirations to move to greater prosperity at home and influence abroad; and it has historical ties with two of the four leaders of the coalition of autocrats (i.e., Russia and Iran, not China and North Korea). These factors make democracy more attractive geopolitically and prevent others from driving a false wedge between nations with what we might call global identity politics; that is, calling democracy as white and colonialist. Its relationships with Russia and Iran give India the unique ability to pass information between the two coalitions, thereby reducing the possibility of an escalating conflict. They also give Indian leaders the ability to understand the perspective of that side of the geopolitical divide in a way that others in the coalition do not possess. To be clear, that understanding does not equate to agreement or even sympathy; nor does it make India a mere water carrier between the two sides. It does, however, mean that India will have insights into how conflicts might be de-escalated or resolved, and how the two global coalitions find common ground. They key is for India to recognize its uniqueness and act in a way that asserts it. The past decade has demonstrated that India can and will do that. Remain strong, India, and don’t let others treat you otherwise.
It is, however, impossible to look at coming Indian foreign policy without considering the “Trump factor.” The friendship and commonality of perspectives that Trump and Modi share was on full display during Trump’s first term and appears to be headed for renewed vigor once Trump takes office in January. Trump’s foreign policy and economic appointments see India in a positive light in a way that was missing during the Administration of President Joe Biden, whose India policy was characterized by pandering to its anti-India base and virtue signaling. Those days end with Trump’s inauguration on January 20, 2025. Traditionally, American foreign policy leaders see the world in terms of spheres of influence. India’s dominance over a critical sphere containing South Asia, Central Asia, and beyond, fits perfectly into Trump’s foreign policy vision. Stand by and strengthen friends who will help the US reduce its international presence and footprint and the world’s policeman. That means:
1. Continuing to utilize its demographic and other edges to overtake China as Asia’s dominant power. Create a space that is friendly to the foreign investment fleeing India’s giant neighbor to the east and northeast. Continue standing strong against Chinese border incursions and territorial claims (e.g. Arunachal Pradesh). Take an aggressive stance in sheltering the Dalai Lama and others opposed to the Chinese takeover of Tibet. Strengthen relations with Taiwan, perhaps with joint ventures in advanced technology.
2.Strengthening its critical relationship with Israel. This has become one of the most important bi-lateral relationships in the world and benefits both countries so that each can give its best to the other while being its best for its own people. Over time, phase out Russian military technology that has proven itself inferior on battlefields from Ukraine to Iran; and replace it with Israeli arms and India’s own home grown arms industry. Complete the process Modi started in 2014 to move away from its pro-Palestinian or now sometimes purposely ambiguous stance to a full-fledged partnership. Continue incentivizing mutual efforts at business development and tourism. India also would be smart to reject vociferously the International Criminal Court’s biased, Israel-hating activities that have brought arrest warrants against Israeli leaders. Besides the fact that they are morally and legally flawed, if these warrants if allowed to be effective, Modi and other Indian leaders demonized by the soft left, could very well be their next targets.
3.There’s so much for India in its immediate vicinity. When Pakistan collapses, which might be during Modi’s time in office, provide a safe haven for persecuted ethnic and religious minorities, help eliminate its terrorist camps, and offer its good offices to bring the situation under control (whatever is needed for that). As noted above, India’s role will be critical in determining what happens to Bangladesh. India can be the dominant godfather to save Sri Lanka when its economy finally gives up the ghost. And India should be a regional leader whose strength helps Nepal and Bhutan rebuff Chinese imperialism and territorial grabs by the Chinese Communists.
4.It means insisting on a permanent UN Security Council seat: getting open support for it from the United States and never backing down from it when opposed by others, including former colonial powers.
5.Taking an ever more visible and greater leadership role in the battle between democracy and autocracy, freedom and state slavery. Assist other, currently non-democratic nations in granting their peoples greater freedoms and a fair and transparent leadership. Help them show the world that democracy can thrive in the Global South.
There is a plethora of other actions India could take, and the way India helps craft the concrete expressions of that relationship in action and dominance will be critical in shaping India’s role in the world for decades to come.